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6.  Caring, rescuing or punishing? 
Rewriting RMS v Spain (ECtHR) 
from an integrated approach to the 




RMS v Spain concerns the removal of the applicant’s daughter and her 
placement in institutional and foster care with a view to her adoption, 
on the sole account of her mother’s poverty.1 In a 2013 judgment, the 
European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter, ECHR or ‘the Court’) 
found for the applicant and declared a violation of her right to family life, 
while dismissing her complaint on discrimination. At first glance, the case 
may not seem the most appealing one from the European Court’s docket 
to reflect upon and rewrite. The judgment has not attracted much schol-
arly attention,2 and in any case, the ruling is certainly welcome. It conveys 
the message that financial hardship alone cannot justify the separation 
of children from their families. It also underscores the role of the state in 
supporting families to overcome material hurdles, instead of adopting the 
* This research has been funded by the Interuniversity Attraction Poles 
Programme initiated by the Belgian Science Policy Office, more specifically the 
IAP ‘The Global Challenge of Human Rights Integration: Towards a Users’ 
Perspective’ <www.hrintegration.be>.
1 RMS v Spain App no 28775/12 (ECHR, 8 June 2013).
2 See for example Cristina Castellote, ‘R.M.S. v Spain: A mother’s  economic 
hardship does not justify permanent separation from her child’ (2013) 2 CHRLR 
272. Brief references to the case can also be found in Françoise Tulkens, ‘The 
European Convention on Human Rights and the economic crisis: The issue 
of poverty’ (2013) EUI Working Papers AEL 2013/08, 12-13, accessed 13 
March 2017 at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/28099/AEL_2013_08.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
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most drastic measure envisaged to protect children. Ultimately, the case 
does not posit a novel question, but rather an old one: the problem of 
‘rescuing’ children from poor families. This issue has been widely debated 
in several countries where the interactions between child welfare systems, 
poverty and disadvantaged communities – such as  Afro-American and 
Indigenous families – have disquieted many.3 Nonetheless, recently similar 
longstanding concerns have gained resonance in Europe. In 2015 the 
European Parliamentary Assembly drew attention to the fact that, despite 
the absence of statistics, evidence suggests that ‘children from  vulnerable 
groups are disproportionally represented in the care  population of 
member states’, whereas no evidence suggests that parents who are poor, 
less  educated, belong to minorities or have a migration background 
are more likely to abuse or neglect their  children.4 The  vulnerability 
of  disadvantaged families to forcible separation may be exacerbated 
by  economic crises and liberalization trends which tend to add to the 
 ‘privatization’ of child-care responsibilities.5
In this context, and despite first impressions, there are good reasons 
to choose RMS. Even though the judgment is not the only one issued 
by the Strasbourg Court which deals with the taking of children from 
impoverished families into care,6 this one offers particularly interesting 
3 In the United States, for instance, the debate has focused on the punitive 
character of foster care systems with regard to Afro-American and ‘Latinos’ 
 families, particularly, poor mothers. In Australia similar discussions have taken 
place with regard to children from indigenous communities. See for example 
Dorothy E Roberts, Shattered Bonds: The Color of Child Welfare (Basic Civitas 
Books 2002) 7–10; Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Report 
of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Children from Their Families (1997); ATD Fourth World, How Poverty Separates 
Parents and Children: A Challenge to Human Rights (2004). Another area of 
concern is the disproportional removal of children from parents with disabilities. 
See for example Victorian Office of the Public Advocate, OPA Position Statement: 
The removal of children from their parent with a disability (2012), accessed 13 March 
2017 at http://www.publicadvocate.vic.gov.au/our-services/publications-forms/72-
the-removal-of-children-from-their-parent-with-a-disability?path=.
4 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly of 13 March 2015, Social 
services in Europe: legislation and practice of the removal of children from their 
families in Council of Europe member States (2015) Doc 13730, para 4.
5 Dorothy E. Roberts, ‘The dialectic of privacy and punishment in the 
 gendered regulation of parenting’ (2009) 5 SJCR&CL 191, 192–3.
6 Other judgments dealing with this matter are: Moser v Austria App no 
12643/02 (ECHR, 21 September 2006); Wallová and Walla v The Czech Republic 
App no 23848/04 (ECHR, 26 October 2006); Havelka and Others v the Czech 
Republic App no 23499/06 (ECHR, 21 June 2007); Saviny v Ukraine App no 
39948/06 (ECHR, 18 December 2008); A.K. and L. v Croatia App no 37956/11 
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elements for analysis. To start with, RMS concerns the parenting rights 
of an afro-descendant and impoverished single mother living within an 
 unconventional family.7 In the second place, the case raises some structural 
issues underlying the dynamics between child welfare systems and families 
living in poverty (particularly those led by single women) such as cultural 
prejudice manifested in compounded stereotypes. Third, the case also 
poses the question of the fairness and participation afforded to extended 
family members and children in decision-making processes. In sum, RMS 
allows us to examine the extent to which supranational  monitoring bodies 
can apply human rights standards in a way that captures the experience of 
poor women and children experiencing both marginalization on account 
of intersecting identities and socio-economic disadvantages.
In what follows, I attempt to explain why these challenges can be better 
undertaken by adopting an integrated approach to human rights law. 
I start by outlining the main factual and legal dimensions of the case, 
which I situate not only in the Court’s case law but also in the Spanish 
institutional context. Next, I justify my proposal of infusing the case 
with children’s rights, gender and poverty perspectives on human rights 
law. By combining and incorporating these approaches, including their 
respective theoretical and normative frameworks, I then proceed to 
 critically analyse the Court’s reasoning in RMS while  acknowledging 
that this deserves to be commended in several respects. The chapter first 
problematizes the  allocation of children’s care and well-being to the 
‘private’ realm of families and questions the way the ECHR assessed 
the  impermissibility of family separation on the ground of poverty. 
Second, attention is drawn to the compounded stereotypes underlying 
the  decisions of the Spanish authorities and which the ECHR failed to 
challenge. Third, the chapter revisits the ECHR’s scrutiny of the domestic 
judicial control and  decision-making process over both the girl’s removal 
and her placement.
In the rewritten judgment, I attempt to recast the Court’s reasoning and 
argumentation with regard to the right to family life and the prohibition 
of discrimination. Moreover, in the case of the latter I suggest that the 
Court should have analysed the merits of the complaint, which leads me to 
propose a different outcome on this part of the applicant’s claim.
(ECHR, 8 January 2013); RMS v Spain (n 1); N.P. v the Republic of Moldova App 
no 58455/13 (ECHR, 6 October 2015).
7 The subsequent case of Soares de Melo v Portugal also concerns a young 
single mother living in poverty. See Soares de Melo v Portugal App no 72850/14 
(ECHR, 16 February 2016).
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1.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND, LEGAL 
ARGUMENTS AND RELEVANT CONTEXT
1.1 Facts and Legal Claims
The applicant was a Spanish woman of Guinean origin who, at the time 
of the events, was 26 years old and living within an extended family 
 comprised by her grandmother, great-uncle and her three children. She 
was an agricultural worker in Andalusia while temporally grape picking in 
France. Trying to avoid taking her two eldest sons with her when she had 
to go to France, she placed them in the foster care of her great-uncle, who 
looked after them when she was away. Yet, they all lived together.
On 23 August 2005 the applicant’s daughter (‘G.’) aged three years and 
ten months at the time, was taken away from her mother at the request of 
a social worker, after the applicant had visited the social services seeking 
socio-economic support (‘work, food and housing’). Two days later the 
administrative authorities issued a provisional decision declaring the girl’s 
abandonment. The decision cited, among other factors, the applicant’s 
serious financial hardship, the child’s lack of hygiene, the fact that she was 
inappropriately dressed for the summer weather, her dry skin marked with 
scratches and her anxiety about food.8 The girl was placed in a children’s 
home in Granada and subsequently transferred to another home more 
than 130 kilometres away, without her mother’s knowledge and consent. 
The applicant was at first allowed supervised meetings with her daughter. 
But these were soon discontinued because of the applicant’s allegedly 
 disruptive behaviour. Mother and daughter saw each other for the last 
time on 27 September 2005.
In February 2006 administrative authorities confirmed the girl’s 
 abandonment and initiated proceedings for placing her in pre-adoption 
foster care. However, the social services had entered into contact with 
the foster family just few days after the mother-child separation.9 The 
applicant unsuccessfully opposed the declaration of abandonment, the 
discontinuation of her visits and the decision to place her daughter with 
a foster family. In May 2007 a judicial hearing was held concerning the 
suspension of visits and the applicants’ appeal against the declaration 
of abandonment. The judgment – upheld on appeal – found against 
the applicant. Subsequent judgments issued in 2009 and 2010 approved all 
8 The problems with her skin were due to an atopic seborrheic dermatitis; a 
fact known to the authorities.
9 RMS v Spain (n 1) paras 15, 26.
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the administrative decisions taken. The applicant’s request to place G. in 
the foster care of her great-uncle was dismissed and he was not allowed to 
give his testimony in court.
It is relevant to take a closer look at the reasons invoked by the 
social worker who requested the removal of the girl, as well as at those 
 provided by the administrative and judicial authorities involved. Besides 
the state of the girl referred to above, the motives put forward included: 
the  applicant’s perceived defiant attitude, aggressive behaviour, alleged 
mental illness, lack of social skills or ignorance; her insufficient efforts to 
avoid a situation of social and professional isolation and the incapacity 
of her great-uncle to look after her children. Strikingly, no expert reports 
were cited to support those assertions. No evidence of child abuse, lack of 
affection or maltreatment was ever found. Additional factors considered 
by the authorities were: the period of time without any mother-child 
contact; the fact that her other children were in the foster care of the 
 applicant’s great-uncle and her new pregnancy.
Relying on article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(hereinafter ‘the Convention’), the applicant complained that she was 
unjustly separated from her daughter. She asserted that she had always 
worked and had both the means and aptitude to raise her daughter. In 
her view, the social services had been biased against her. They had put 
her daughter in foster care without the domestic courts having ruled 
on her supposed abandonment and judges had refused to examine 
the  irregularities in the administrative proceedings.10 Under article 
14 the applicant claimed that she was discriminated against in the 
 enjoyment of family life on the grounds of her race, her Guinean origin, 
the  colour  of  her skin, her physical appearance and her culture and 
lifestyle.
1.2 RMS Outside and Inside the Court’s Jurisprudence
Within the Spanish context, RMS is not an isolated case.11 Institutional 
and structural factors may contribute to that. Amongst the institutional 
factors, it is relevant to consider the domestic legislation governing the 
case (dictated by autonomous community regulations not harmonized 
10 RMS v Spain (n 1), paras 64–65.
11 See Patricia Manrique, ‘Un centenar de casos contra la retirada de tutelas 
sobre los menores’ (Periódico Diagonal, 16/04/2013), accessed 13 March 2017 at 
www.diagonalperiodico.net/libertades/centenar-casos-contra-la-retirada-tutelas-
sobre-menores.html.
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at the national level)12 and the way it operated in practice. At the time 
of the events, social services were legally entitled to remove children and 
automatically undertake their guardianship whenever they considered 
them to be in abandonment. Judicial review of the removal would proceed 
if requested by the parents when circumstances had changed.13 In practice, 
realization of judicial control could take a considerable time. Meanwhile 
administrative authorities were entitled to provisionally place children in 
foster care. Where the child had spent significant time with a foster family, 
child return became unlikely, as RMS testifies.14 This case also suggests 
that such institutional design may have particular detrimental effects 
for socio-economically disadvantaged families. In fact, persons living in 
poverty face countless obstacles in claiming their rights and accessing 
justice in both administrative and judicial settings.15
In June 2013 the ECHR found that Spain had violated the applicant’s 
right to private and family life, while considering it unnecessary to 
examine her complaint on discrimination. The judgment is not isolated 
in the Court’s jurisprudence either. In 2006 and 2007 the Court ruled 
similarly in cases against Austria and the Czech Republic.16 In these cases 
children were separated from their families on account of their parents’ 
poverty, more specifically, because they lacked adequate housing (which 
in RMS was not at issue). But besides differences amongst the applicants 
and the circumstances of the cases, there are also interesting divergences in 
the approach adopted by the Court. Notably, in the judgments  preceding 
RMS, the Court scrutinized the care orders as serious interferences 
with the right to family life, and therefore, it analysed their legality, aim 
and  proportionality. It concluded that since material hardship was not 
12 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations (2010) 
Spain, CRC/C/ESP/CO/3-4, para 9; The EU Parliamentary Assembly has also 
expressed concern about the lack of unified nationwide standards on the matter: 
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly (n 4), para 80. 
13 Civil Code, articles 172–173; Organic Act No 1/1996 of 15 January, 
 articles 17–18, 20–22; Civil Procedure Act of 2000, articles 779–780; Autonomous 
Community of Andalusia Act No 1/1998 of 20 April, article 23.
14 Although domestic laws applicable at the time of RMS have been amended, 
they have not fully overcome reported shortcomings. See for example Pilar 
Moreda, ‘Riesgo, Desamparo y Acogimiento de Menores. Actuación de la 
Administración e Intereses en Juego’ (2011) 15 AFDUAM 15, 52–53.
15 Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, ‘Report of 9 August 2012 of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, submitted in  accordance 
with Human Rights Council resolution’ (2012) 17/13. A/67/278.
16 Moser v Austria (n 6); Wallová and Walla v The Czech Republic (n 6); 
Havelka and Others v the Czech Republic (n 6).
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 sufficient to justify a family breakdown and since other less restrictive 
measures could have been taken, the separations were not proportional, 
that is, not necessary in a democratic society.17 As seen below, this 
unequivocal declaration is not to be found in RMS. It should be observed, 
however, that in a 2015 judgment concerning a child’s placement for 
reasons mainly related to her mother’s poverty, the Court correctly 
relooked at its analysis on legality, aim and proportionality.18 As such, this 
recent judgment has been taken into account when rewriting RMS.
In RMS the Court centred its examination not on the legitimacy of a 
state interference, but on the state’s positive obligations in terms of ‘a 
parent’s right to the taking of measures with a view to his or her being 
reunited with the child’.19 After revising the steps undertaken by the 
administrative authorities in RMS, the Court took the view that they 
acted with a serious lack of diligence. As to the decision-making process 
and given the applicant’s complaint that domestic courts did not examine 
the irregularities in the administrative proceedings, the Court was mostly 
satisfied with the protection of the applicant’s interests before the judicial 
authorities.20 The Court then proceeded to evaluate the state conduct 
alongside two stages in the girl-mother separation: the taking into care and 
the placement in pre-adoption foster care.
With respect to the taking of the girl into care, the Court was of the 
view that in the circumstances of the case the decision adopted by the 
social worker was understandable. However, it should have been swiftly 
followed by appropriate measures to examine the child-parent situation 
and reunite the family.21 Recalling that the applicant’s ability to provide 
her daughter with educational and emotional support was not at issue, the 
court observed that the care order ‘was made because of the applicant’s 
difficult financial situation at the time, without any account being taken 
of subsequent changes in her circumstances’.22 The shortage of funds faced 
by the applicant was a situation ‘which the national authorities could have 
helped remedy by means other than the complete break-up of the family’.23
With regard to the girl’s placement in pre-adoption foster care, the Court 
called into question the assessment of the administrative  authorities and, 
17 Wallová and Walla v The Czech Republic (n 6), paras 74–78; Havelka and 
Others v the Czech Republic (n 6), paras 55–57, 60–63.
18 N.P. v the Republic of Moldova (n 6).
19 RMS v Spain (n 1) para 81.
20 ibid, para 78.
21 ibid, para 83. 
22 ibid, para 85.
23 ibid, para85-86.
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to a lesser extent, also that of the domestic courts.24 The Court pointed out 
that ‘the applicant was forced to prove that she was a good mother to her 
child and when she submitted evidence to that end the competent courts 
considered, without any supporting arguments, that it was  insufficient 
to outweigh the assessment of the  administrative authorities’.25It also 
observed that domestic courts validated the  pre-adoption placement 
mainly because of the lack of contact between the girl and her mother 
during several years, which actually was the result of the  administrative 
and judicial decisions taken.26 The Court concluded: ‘the Spanish 
 authorities failed to undertake appropriate and sufficient efforts to secure 
the  applicant’s right to live with her child, in breach of her right to respect 
for her private and family life’.27
As indicated at the outset, and starting from an integrated  perspective 
of human rights norms concerning women and children living in poverty, 
I argue that three aspects of the Court’s reasoning in RMS warrant a 
 critical appraisal. First, the Court’s ambiguous argumentation regarding 
the  impermissibility of family separation on the sole account of poverty. 
Second, the Court’s failure to unveil and question the compounded 
 stereotypes underlying the decisions of the Spanish authorities. Third, I 
contend that the Court should have further scrutinized the judicial control 
and the decision-making process over both the girl’s removal and her 
 placement. In the course of this critical assessment I will also highlight the 
aspects of the judgment that deserve to be praised. But before turning to this, 
the  following section sketches the normative and theoretical  underpinnings 
of the integrated approach to human rights law undertaken in this chapter.
2.  INTEGRATING THEORETICAL AND 
NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHTS 
OF CHILDREN AND WOMEN IN POVERTY
2.1 Preliminary Remarks on an Integrated View of Human Rights Law
The so-called fragmentation of human rights law tends to feed an  isolated 
view of both rights holders and rights regimes.28 This holds true for 
24 ibid, paras 87-89.
25 ibid, para 89.
26 ibid, para 92.
27 ibid, para 93.
28 Eva Brems, ‘Should pluriform human rights become one? Exploring the 
benefits of human rights integration’ (2014) 4 EJHR 447, 452. 
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the ECHR insofar as this regional court is designed to afford general 
 protection only to individuals who bring a complaint about violations 
of their (mostly civil and political) rights enshrined in the ECHR. Thus, 
in RMS the Court focused on the applicant, the mother who lost her 
 daughter, and her right to family life protected by the Convention. While 
this approach is justified, a more integrated view of human rights law is 
desirable. The following lines argue in favour of incorporating  theoretical 
and normative insights from children’s and women’s rights as well as 
developments concerning the rights of people living in poverty. Why 
do so?
A first reason seems obvious: the rights of the applicant’s daughter, a 
girl, were also affected. Second, the human rights experiences of mother 
and child were compounded by disadvantages related to both gender and 
poverty. Integrating these perspectives facilitates a more comprehensive 
and context-sensitive examination of the case. Not only are all rights 
holders and normative frameworks involved considered, but artificial 
boundaries between civil/political and social/economic rights are also 
eroded. Thus, this chapter builds upon two dimensions of integration 
that help in doing better justice to the lived experience of the applicant 
and her daughter, namely, intersectionality and indivisibility. As will 
become clear in the following sections, the violations of their rights occur 
at the  intersection of their identities and socio-economic disadvantage. 
Unjust family separation and forced child removal are human rights 
violations that particularly affect single women and children living in 
poverty. Additionally, the integrated perspective defended here facilitates 
an understanding of the right to family life that incorporates aspects of 
socio-economic protection without which the former would be of little 
relevance in a case like RMS.
2.2 An Integrated Approach to Caring
Care is an essential aspect of human existence. Our lives are  interdependent 
with the lives of others in multiple ways that engage our experiences as 
both caregivers and care-receivers.29 A case like RMS reminds us that care 
is a need for both parents and children. From a human rights perspective, 
this translates into the right of the former to care for their children and the 
right of the latter to be cared for by their parents. Such a right of parents 
and children is covered, inter alia, by the right to family life derived from 
29 Robin L West, Re-Imagining Justice: Progressive Interpretations of Formal 
Equality, Rights, and the Rule of Law (Ashgate 2003) 94–5.
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the right to private life, as acknowledged by the ECHR.30 In  addition, the 
right of a child to be cared for by his or her parents has explicit  recognition 
in article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child  (hereinafter, 
CRC). These rights are not only vested in parents and  children sensu 
stricto; they extend well beyond the context of nuclear  families to 
 encompass the reality of diverse families.31 Moreover, the dynamics of 
care are not static or unidirectional and, of course, care is neither just a 
(private) matter for families.
Society’s functioning is premised upon chains of mutual  dependence 
and care. In one way or another all institutions are sustained by the 
 (uncompensated and undervalued) care work undertaken within  families 
and primarily by women. This fact reinforces the claim that states must 
take part in caregiving by providing support and protecting both  caregivers 
and care-receivers against subordination and impoverishment. Normative 
recognition of the societal value of and state  responsibility in caregiving 
relations, however, still falls short of what it ought to be.32 Yet, some 
recognition can be found in a number of provisions of the CRC. Having 
stated the primary responsibility of parents in  child-rearing,  articles 
18(2), 19(2), 24(2)(e)(f) and 27(1) and (3) demand that the state should 
render appropriate assistance to caregivers, to ensure the  development 
of  institutions, facilities and services for the care of children; to provide 
parents and other caregivers with social programs and material support 
to ensure children an adequate standard of living. Importantly, state 
support and involvement in child upbringing is not only in the  interest 
of parents/care-givers, it is also in the interest of children. This triangular 
relation (state-caregivers-children) referred to as the trias pedagogica is 
 characteristic of the children’s human rights framework.33
When the above societal dimension is forgotten and caregiving, 
30 Ursula Kilkelly, ‘Effective protection of children’s rights in family cases: 
An international approach’ (2002) 12 TL&CP 335, 353; European Union Agency 
for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, Handbook on European Law 
Relating to the Rights of the Child (2015) 76–86. 
31 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General comment No 14 on the 
Right of the Child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration 
(article 3, para. 1) (2013) CRC/C/GC/14, para 65.
32 So far neither the right to work nor the right to family life or to  protection 
of the family seem to encompass care work. Moreover, in the social and cultural 
imaginary caregiving is generally devalued. On possibilities to subvert the social 
meaning of caregiving see Laura T Kessler, ‘The politics of care’ (2008) 23 
WJLG&S 169, 169–ff.
33 Jan C M Willems, ‘The children’s Law of Nations: The international rights 
of the child in the Trias Pedagogica’ in Jan C M Willems, Developmental and 
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 particularly child-rearing responsibilities, are located in the exclusive 
and ‘private’ confines of families or markets – when families can afford 
 resorting to the latter – any ‘failure’ in child-rearing may be attributed 
to punishable individual faults which children must be rescued from. 
Material or environmental deficits are often viewed through this prism. 
The long history of difficult encounters between socio-economically 
 disadvantaged families and foster care systems is closely related to the 
idea that poverty coincides with faulty parenthood and that satisfaction of 
children’s needs requires taking them away.34
2.3  Child-protection, Mother-punishment Dynamics and Compounded 
Stereotypes
Although the concerns arising from the conflation of poverty with neglect 
are often expressed in terms of the harm inflicted upon parents and 
 children living in poverty, this account needs to be gendered since women 
are  overwhelmingly responsible for child upbringing. Martha A Fineman 
coined the concept of ‘the neutered mother’ to criticize the way the 
 institution of ‘Mother’ has been detached from context. The mother, she 
argues, is  conceptually separated from her children; she is de-classed and 
 de-raced.35 As explained by Fineman, this process of de-contextualization 
has gone hand in hand with upholding the ideal of family premised on the 
couple-based family unit: the traditional nuclear family.36 Not only does 
the heteronormative family get thereby normalized, but so do culturally 
dominant narratives such as those of the white, Christian, middle-class 
family.37 Accordingly, single mothers and children who experience poverty 
and live within an extended family, as in the RMS case, embody a deviant 
family. Moreover, their poverty adds to the risk of having their family ties 
 undervalued and severed.38 Inasmuch as child-care work is undervalued, 
Autonomy Rights of Children. Empowering Children, Caregivers and Communities 
(Intersentia 2007) 84.
34 Dorothy E Roberts, ‘Child Welfare and Civil Rights’ (2003) UILR 171, 
175; Tanya A Cooper, ‘Racial Bias in American Foster Care: The National 
Debate’ (2013) 97 MLR 215, 227 (citing Leroy H Pelton, 1989 at xiii-xiv).
35 Martha A Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other 
Twentieth Century Tragedies (Routledge 1995) 67.
36 ibid, 88–89. 
37 Janet L Wallace and Lisa R Pruitt, ‘Judging parents’ (2012) 1 MLR 95, 116; 
Annette R Appell, ‘Protecting children or punishing mothers: Gender, race and 
class in the child protection system’ (1997) 48 SCLR 577, 585.
38 Some suggest that among the factors of deviance, it is poverty that  primarily 
subjects families to the suspension of their rights to privacy and protection against 
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women are also more exposed to economic deprivation. This is made 
visible when they have no choice but to turn to the state for support, as 
the applicant in RMS did. Where the state’s answer to that consists of 
child-mother separation, such response risks being more punitive of the 
mother’s ‘failure’ than protective of the child. This is quite problematic 
from the perspective of children’s rights too, insofar as the child’s interests 
and needs then tend to be replaced by others’ social standards.39
As discussed below, the RMS case attests that underlying the process of 
‘othering’ single poor mothers may be stereotypes and bias concerning both 
gender roles (particularly in regard to motherhood)40 and the  experience 
of poverty. Stereotypes, as defined by Rebecca Cook and Simone Cusak, 
are generalized views or preconceptions about the attributes of members 
of a particular group or about the roles they should perform in society.41 
Like these authors, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW Committee) has paid particular attention to 
harmful gender stereotypes and has made a human rights obligation of 
their dismantling.42 Typical gender stereotypes of women portray them as 
being the home and child carer. These kinds of harmful categorizations 
fall under the scope of discrimination against women.43 In recent years UN 
Human Rights mechanisms have also called upon states to tackle harmful 
stereotypes about people living in poverty, who are often perceived as 
lazy, irresponsible, indifferent to their children’s health and education, 
state intervention. See Khiara M Bridges, ‘Privacy rights and public families’ 
(2011) 34 HJL&G 113, 117–19, 150–3. 
39 On how children’s needs are often replaced by the needs of others see 
Abdullahi An-Na‘Im, ‘Cultural transformation and Normative Consensus on the 
Best Interest of the Child’ (1994) 8 IJL&F 62, 73–4.
40 See among others, Emily Winograd, ‘Expecting the unattainable:  caseworker 
use of the “ideal” mother stereotype against the non-offending mother for failure 
to protect from child sexual abuse cases’ (2013) 69 NYUASAL 311, 326–9.
41 Rebeca J Cook and Simone Cusack, Gender Stereotyping: Transnational 
Legal Perspectives (University of Pennsylvania Press 2010) 9–13. See also 
Alexandra Timmer, ‘Toward an anti-stereotyping approach for the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 11.4 HRLR 707, 707–38.
42 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (Hereinafter CEDAW), Introduction and articles 2(f), 5(a), 10(c); 
CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 25 on article 4, paragraph 
1, of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women on Temporary Special Measures (2004), para 7; CEDAW Committee, 
General Recommendation No 28 of 16 December 2010 on the core obligations of 
States parties under article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (2010) CEDAW/C/GC/28, para 9, 22.
43 ibid.
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 dishonest and undeserving. 44 Equality and non-discrimination standards 
usually also play out significantly in addressing violations stemming from 
poverty or from perceived ‘markers’ of poverty.45 Alongside violating 
human rights, such stereotypes justify existing power imbalances.
Different stereotypes do not run on parallel tracks though. Typically, 
people are confronted with compounded stereotypes. That is, different stere-
otypes intersect or interact to assign characteristics to members of subgroups 
of people.46 For example, young mothers living in poverty are perceived as 
incarnating a combination of the aforesaid characteristics. Inadvertently, 
stereotypes shape social expectations in general, including those of social 
workers, judges and other actors dealing with child protection services.47 
As argued below, this played a role in the case of RMS, albeit the ECHR – 
unfortunately – did not say it. In the rewritten judgment I attempt to remedy 
this silence by (1) examining the merits of the complaint on discrimination; 
(2) identifying the compounded stereotypes and dominant notions on valued 
families underlying the decisions of the Spanish authorities; and (3) finding a 
violation of article 14 ECHR on that account (see paras 97–98 bis).
3.  ASSESSING THE REASONING OF THE COURT 
FROM AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO 
HUMAN RIGHTS
As already mentioned, human rights law protects the right of children to 
be cared for and raised by their parents as well as the right of the latter 
44 UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), ‘General 
Comment No 20 of 2 July 2009 on Non-discrimination in economic, social and 
cultural rights (art 2, para 2, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights’ (2009) E/C.12/GC/20, para 35; UN, ‘Guiding Principles on 
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights (2012) Principle 21’; UNHRC, ‘Report of the 
UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, report submitted by 
Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona’ (2011) A/66/265, para 7.
45 See among others, CESCR, ‘General Comment No 20’ (n 44), para 35; 
European Committee of Social Rights, ‘Conclusions, General Introduction, 
January 2014’ (2013) 11. See also Sheilagh Turkington, ‘A Proposal to Amend 
the Ontario Human Rights Code : Recognizing Povertyism’ (1993) 9 JL&SP 
134, 134; Sandra Fredman, ‘Positive Duties and Socio-Economic Disadvantage: 
Bringing Disadvantage onto the Equality Agenda’ (2010) 1 LRPS 1, 6–8; F Pearl 
Eliadis, Poverty and Exclusion: Normative Approaches to Policy Research (Policy 
Research Initiative 2004) 18–22.
46 Cook and Cusack (n 41) 29–31.
47 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly (n 4), para 9; Cooper (n 34) 
248–9.
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to care for their children.48 As a corollary of these rights, article 9 of the 
CRC sets down very strict conditions for authorizing family separation. 
The seriousness of the measure and its last resort nature are expressed 
in two key principles. The first one dictates that children shall not be 
separated from their parents unless this is necessary for the children’s best 
interest.49 The second one is that separation shall be subject to judicial 
review and all proceedings must be fair.50 The Court has drawn similar 
requirements from article 8 of the Convention. Let’s then take these two 
principles to examine the RMS judgment.
3.1 Best Interest, Family Separation and Poverty
Child removal is a highly delicate matter. Only exceptional circumstances 
that cannot be remedied by other means may justify family separation.51 
The wording of the CRC refers to ‘abuse or neglect of the child by the 
parents’52 and many domestic laws define these and similar notions in 
detail. Even then, assessing the circumstances under which the legal 
 criteria are met has proven to be challenging. The best interest of the child 
is the pivotal factor.53 However, the CRC Committee has pointed out 
that the flexibility of the concept of ‘best interest’ does not only make it 
more responsive to the actual and diverse situations of children, but also 
makes it prone to manipulation and abuse by state authorities.54 This is 
the case when poverty or non-conformity with a dominant family model 
is  conflated with neglect or abandonment.55 The CRC Committee recalls 
that, in the same way that the Convention on the Rights of People with 
Disabilities prohibits children’s separation on the sole ground of their or 
48 Convention on the Rights of the Child, article 7.
49 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), article 9(1). See also African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, article 19 and the Preamble and 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959) article 6.
50 CRC, article 9(1) and (2).
51 Council of Europe, Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to 
member states on children’s rights and social services friendly to children and families 
(CM/Rec(2011)12, 2011) 8.
52 CRC, article 9(1).
53 CRC, article 3(1). See also Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, article 24(4). 
54 CRC Committee, ‘General Comment No 14 of 29 May 2013 on the Right 
of the Child to have his or her Best Interests taken as a Primary Consideration’ 
(article 3, para 1) (2013) CRC/C/GC/14, para 34.
55 See for example CRC Committee, ‘Concluding Observations on Azerbaijan’ 
(2012) CRC/C/AZE/CO/2, paras 37–38; CRC Committee, Concluding  observations 
on Hungary (2006) CRC/C/HUN/CO/2, para 30.
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their parents’ disability,56 separation for mere economic reasons is not 
acceptable either. Instead, states should support families and enhance their 
capacity to care for their children.57 Other UN and regional organs have 
echoed this principle.58 Within the Council of Europe, Recommendation 
Rec(2006)19 of the Committee of Ministers on policy to support positive 
parenting recommends that member states should create conditions for 
positive parenting, by ensuring that all those rearing children have access 
to an appropriate level and diversity of resources.59 In providing support, 
account should be taken of the possible fear of parents in a situation 
of social exclusion towards social services, particularly of having their 
 children taken away.60 In addition to family support, Recommendation 
Rec (2005)5 of the Committee of Ministers on the rights of children 
living in residential institutions also reaffirms the principles of last resort 
and periodical review of child placement as well as the right to maintain 
regular contact with the child’s family and other significant people.61
The ECHR has also endorsed the exceptionality of family separation 
and the pre-eminence of the child’s best interest in a number of cases 
concerning child custody and child removal, including RMS.62 Whilst 
the Court admits that member states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation 
in evaluating the need for taking a child into care, which can be better 
assessed by the national authorities who have the benefit of direct contact 
with the family concerned, it also recognizes that such latitude has to be 
weighed up against the grave consequences that care orders may entail. 
Thus, following an initial removal order, stricter scrutiny is necessary for 
measures further restricting parental rights or limiting access between 
56 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, article 23(4).
57 CRC Committee, ‘General Comment No 14’ (n 54), paras 61–63.
58 See inter alia, UN, General Assembly, Resolution of 24 February 2010 
on Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children (2010) A/RES/64/142, para 
15; Inter-American Commission of Human Rights Doc. 54/13 of 17 October 
2013 on The Right of Boys and Girls to a Family. Alternative Care. Ending 
Institutionalization in the Americas (2013) Report OEA/Ser.L/V/II., 75–78.
59 Council of Europe, ‘Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers 
to member states on policy to support positive parenting’ (Rec (2006) 19) 
Recommendation 3(i).
60 ibid, Recommendation 8(i).
61 Council of Europe, Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to 
member states on the rights of children living in residential institutions (Rec(2005)5, 
2005) Appendix to Recommendation, Basic Principles.
62 Kutzner v Germany App no 46544/99 (ECHR, 26 February 2002), paras 
75–76; Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland App no 41615/07 (GC ECHR, 6 July 
2010), para 136; Wallová and Walla v The Czech Republic (n 6), paras 70–72; RMS 
v Spain (n 1), para 71.
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 children and parents.63 State authorities must provide sufficiently sound 
and weighty considerations in the interests of the child.64 The  intervention 
must be prescribed by law, oriented towards a legitimate aim, and 
 necessary in a democratic society. The Court has examined the invocation 
of economic or environmental reasons for child removal and placement 
under the  proportionality requisite. In that context, it has found that 
‘it is not enough that the child would be better off if placed in care’.65 
Moreover, assessing proportionality has led the Court to evaluate the 
state’s consideration of alternatives and the positive steps undertaken by 
it to explore them.
Similar to the CRC Committee’s approach, the Court determined in 
RMS that:
the Spanish administrative authorities should have considered other less 
drastic measures than taking the child into care. The role of the social welfare 
 authorities is precisely to help persons in difficulty . . . to advise them on 
matters such as the different types of benefits available, the possibility of 
obtaining social housing and other means of overcoming their difficulties, such 
as those originally sought by the applicant.66
So far so good. I applaud the way the Court used the ‘less restrictive 
means test’67 to highlight the state responsibility in working together with 
families in the uprising of children. Yet, I regret that the Court seems to 
adopt a less categorical position than the CRC Committee (and its own 
previous jurisprudence) when it comes to the illegitimacy of child removal 
on account of the parents’ poverty. This is first noticeable in the way the 
Court structured its legal analysis which, eventually, omitted to qualify the 
child separation as disproportional. According to the Court:
the crucial question in the present case is . . . whether the national  authorities 
took all the necessary and appropriate measures that could reasonably be 
expected of them to ensure that the child could lead a normal family life within 
63 See for example Johansen v Norway App no 17383/90 (ECHR, 7 August 
1996), para 64; Kutzner v Germany (n 62), para 67.
64 Saviny v Ukraine (n 6), para 49.
65 Olsson v Sweden App no 10465/83 (ECHR, 24 March 1988), para 72; Saviny 
v Ukraine (n 6), para 50; Wallová and Walla v The Czech Republic (n 6), paras 
71–72. 
66 RMS v Spain (n 1), para 86.
67 On this ‘test’ see, Eva Brems and Laurens Lavrysen, ‘“Don’t use a 
 sledgehammer to crack a nut”: Less restrictive means in the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2015) 15 HRLR 139, 139–67.
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her own family, before placing her with a foster family with a view to her 
adoption.68
The reasoning that followed mixed arguments calling into question the 
removal itself with arguments dealing with the positive steps adopted by 
the state to avoid the placement of the child in pre-adoption foster care 
and to achieve family reunification instead. Importantly, the three-fold 
criterion of legal conformity, legitimate aim and proportionality went 
overlooked in the judgment. It is unclear why the Court declined to find, 
as it did in prior similar cases against the Czech Republic and Austria,69 
that the applicant’s financial hardship, even if relevant, was not sufficient 
to justify the removal of her daughter and, as such, was disproportional.
Second, a sense of ambiguity also flows from the Court’s emphasis 
on the improvement in the economic situation of the applicant. While 
the Court acknowledges that the applicants’ daughter was taken away 
only because of her mother’s difficult economic situation, it recalls that 
the authorities did not take into account ‘subsequent changes in her 
 [economic]  circumstances’.70 The Court further underlines this point 
by noting that ‘the applicant had simply been faced with a shortage of 
funds’ and domestic courts ‘refused to take into account the change in 
the  applicant’s financial circumstances’. True, the reluctance of domestic 
courts to assess the financial evidence submitted by the applicant was 
part of the problem, but not the main one. And, in any case, proving a 
change in the circumstances originating the child-care order implies that 
the decision in question was sufficient to justify the separation, which 
then can be reversed when such sufficient reasons no longer exist. In 
this case, as in similar cases decided by the Court, the problem is that 
the sole socio-economic situation of the applicant cannot be considered 
sufficient justification. So, what if the applicant’s economic situation 
would not have improved? Could this state of affairs have validated the 
mother-child separation or its prolongation? I do not think so. That is 
why I would have preferred the Court to focus less on this and more on 
the illegitimacy of the family separation, on the one hand, and on the 
positive obligations of the state to protect families against destitution, 
on the other. With regard to this latter issue, it is of note that while the 
Court shows commitment in affirming the state duty to support families 
in difficulties, it is also very cautious in characterizing that endeavour. 
68 RMS v Spain (n 1), para 82.
69 Moser v Austria (n 6); Wallová and Walla v The Czech Republic (n 6); 
Havelka and Others v the Czech Republic (n 6).
70 ibid, para 85.
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The Court uses the verbs ‘to help’, ‘to guide’ and ‘to advise’ with respect 
to possibilities for  obtaining social housing, benefits and other means 
to overcome the  family’s  difficulties.71 I think the Court can say more 
without  compromising the limits of its mandate. After all,  rejecting 
family separation on account of poverty alone  necessarily brings about 
state positive obligations with resource implications, which  confirms 
that no watertight division  separates a civil/political right to family life 
from its socio-economic counterpart.72 Because of this, the rewritten 
 judgment first elaborates on the state’s duties to ensure that caregivers 
have access to resources enabling them to perform their  childrearing tasks 
(see para 71 bis). Then, it explicitly forbids the removal of children on the 
basis of poverty, regardless of any changes in financial circumstances (see 
para 85).
The CRC Committee and the doctrine are right in firmly  proscribing 
child removal on the basis of poverty alone. This is so not just because 
such a measure substitutes children’s interests with dominant views 
on valued families while producing disparate or discriminatory effects. 
Condemning family separation on the sole ground of poverty and 
 demanding state action instead are also necessary to dismantle the 
 ideologies that  normalize poverty and the human rights violations suffered 
by those who struggle with it, and which make of care a ‘private’ matter. 
To this I turn in what follows.
3.2 The Stereotypes at Play: About Gender and Poverty
In both the administrative and judicial proceedings the situation of the 
applicant and her daughter was characterized in the following terms: ‘The 
child’s mother has two other children who have been abandoned . . . No 
member of the extended family (up to the third degree of kinship) is able 
to take care of the child’. ‘The great-uncle who was put in charge of the 
other two children . . . is overburdened’. ‘We are thus dealing with a child 
whose father cannot be traced, who cannot be taken care of by the person 
already looking after her two brothers, and whose mother – who appears to 
have another child under the guardianship of the French  authorities – is 
once again pregnant.’73 The child needed ‘to live in an appropriate family 
 environment’. ‘It is clear . . . that, whether as a result of ignorance, other 
impediments, lack of social skills or any other reason, including  possible 
71 ibid, para 86.
72 Airey v Ireland App no 6289/73 (ECHR, 9 October 1979), para 26.
73 RMS v Spain (n 1), para 34.
 Caring, rescuing or punishing? Rewriting RMS v Spain 165
mental illness . . . the child was in a state of wholesale physical and 
 psychological neglect.’74 ‘Notwithstanding the applicant’s assertion that 
she spoke three languages, she had not attempted to make use of those 
skills, living in a situation of social and professional isolation which forced 
her to emigrate or move around in order to find work.’ As to the applicants’ 
capacity to have her children living with her, domestic judges noted that 
testimonies ‘[had] not provide[d] any evidence of [the applicant’s] social 
and professional stability and of an absence of risk for the child, still less 
[had] they demonstrated how the child would benefit from being returned to 
her original family.’75 The applicant’s behaviour after the child removal 
was described as ‘disruptive of the child’s emotional stability’. She was 
‘disrespectful and violent’ because she ‘had not accepted the visiting hours 
[and] had screamed when the end of the visits approached’.
In light of the above, the applicant’s claim that she was  discriminated 
against and that the authorities had been biased in favour of  separating 
her from her daughter should be taken seriously.76 Similarly to CEDAW’s 
 condemnation of gender stereotypes, the UN Guiding Principles on 
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights underscore the need to protect 
persons living in poverty from discriminatory stigmas attached to 
conditions of poverty.77 Moreover, the EU Parliamentary Assembly 
acknowledges the link between discrimination, the over-representation of 
vulnerable groups in the care population and the incidence of stereotypes 
and prejudice.78
Compounded stereotypes and prejudices appear to be at play in the 
 decisions taken by the Spanish authorities. The applicant was depicted as a 
disinterested mother, whose other children were considered  abandoned and 
at risk because she placed them under the guardianship of her  great-uncle. 
Her extended family constituted an inappropriate  environment and no 
one there, including the applicant herself, was seen as apt for childrearing. 
She is sexually irresponsible (the father of her child is unknown and she is 
once again pregnant). She is also blamed for her own destitution, bearing 
the stigma of not making sufficient efforts despite her skills. She is a bad 
mother who instead of staying close to her children emigrated or moved 
around to work. And when she dares to complain, she is violent, maniac 
74 ibid, para 30.
75 ibid, para 43.
76 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly (n 4), paras 6, 8, 9, 54–55.
77 UN Guiding Principles (n 44), Principle 21.
78 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly (n 4), para 54. See also 
Council of Europe (Rec(2005)5, 2005) (n 61), basic principle on the prohibition of 
discrimination in decisions concerning child placement. 
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or mentally ill. These popular images about impoverished single mothers 
are not infrequent and have been documented elsewhere.79
The ECHR singled out that the Spanish authorities merely  reiterated 
the assertions made by the social workers and that no expert report 
 supported them. Moreover, the Court also observed that the  applicant 
was forced to prove that she was a good mother, while no evidence sub-
mitted to that effect could overcome the judicial authorities’  assumptions. 
However, the Court did not acknowledge that in doing so the state 
 authorities relied on negative stereotypes concerning the applicant’s 
 gendered roles and her socio-economic status. The importance of 
 identifying and combating gender stereotypes is well-grounded to date.80 
And although more needs to be done in this respect, improvements 
are visible within the ECHR and other supranational organs.81 The 
situation looks less promising, however, when it comes to social stigma 
attached to class status or poverty. Perhaps because the application of 
 non-discrimination norms for reasons of poverty is resisted or because 
discourses of difference may tend to side-line socio-economic  disparities, 
misrecognition  associated with the experience of poverty is yet to be 
 challenged by courts like the ECHR and other monitoring organs.82 
Doing so in a case like RMS is necessary not only to overcome status 
subordination – and ensure  recognition – but also to destabilize the social 
structures that  personalize  – ‘privatize’ – both individual and family 
material well-being and the ‘failings’ in  accomplishing it. That is,  striving 
for better  distribution. In fact,  ‘struggles for recognition can aid the 
 redistribution of power and wealth’.83
The fact that the Court did not engage in this analysis and concluded 
instead that there was no separate issue to address under article 14 of the 
Convention may be partly explained by the fact that the applicant did not 
79 J. Bruce Porter, Affidavit before the Superior Court of Justice, Ontario, 
Between Dale Broomer et al and Attorney General of Ontario et al. (2002) Court 
File No: 02-CV-229203 CM3, paras 28–37; Winograd (n 40) 328–9; Shruti Rana, 
‘Restricting the rights of poor mothers: An international human rights critique of 
“workfare”’ (2000) 33 CJL&SP 393, 404–11.
80 See references above in nn 39 and 40.
81 On the ECHR see Timmer (n 41) 717. See also Atala Riffo and daughters v 
Chile (IACtHR, 24 February 2012), paras 109, 111; Artavia Murillo et al. (“In vitro 
fertilization”) v Costa Rica (IACtHR, 28 November 2012), paras 294–7.
82 Similar concerns have been raised with regard to domestic courts. See for 
example Colleen Sheppard, ‘“Bread and roses”: Economic justice and  constitutional 
rights’ (2015) 5 OSLS 225, 235–7; Michele Benedetto,  ‘Socio-economic bias in the 
judiciary’ (2013) 61 CSLR 137, 146ff.
83 Nancy Fraser, ‘Rethinking Recognition’ (2000) 3 NLR 107, 109.
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further elaborate her complaint of discrimination.84 Actually, from the 
parties’ arguments reproduced in the judgment, questions of  stereotyping 
do not appear to have been brought forward. Yet, there are three main 
considerations that led me to propose, when redrafting RMS, that the 
Court should have analysed the merits of the claim of discrimination on 
the basis of the harmful stereotypes described above and should even 
have found a violation of article 14. The first one is that leaving aside 
the  applicants’ framing and argumentation, the Court seems to have 
the tendency to avoid complex questions of discrimination by declining 
to examine the merits of discrimination complaints and referring to its 
own findings under other provisions.85 I advocate for abandoning this 
practice. Second, cases like RMS provide the opportunity to challenge 
the social stigma and negative stereotypes attached to poverty through the 
 prohibition of discrimination. Third, when viewed from the perspective 
of children, it is rather uncontested that children cannot be discriminated 
against in the enjoyment of their right to parental care on the basis of their 
or their family’s socio-economic origin or circumstances. Hence, while 
admittedly the Court was confronted with a scant substantiation of the 
allegation of discrimination, I deliberately use this rewriting exercise to 
stretch the Court’s faculties of adjudication in order to move forward in 
naming and condemning the compounded discriminatory assumptions 
that justify the separation of mother and children living in poverty (see 
paras 97–98 bis of the rewritten judgment).
3.3  The Decision-making Process: Judicial Review, Fairness and 
Participation
The applicant in RMS complained that domestic courts had not revised 
the ‘irregularities’ in the child-care measures adopted by the  administrative 
authorities. According to the Court’s case law, article 8 of the Convention 
requires certain procedural guarantees to be met in order to ensure that 
the decision-making process over care orders affords adequate protection 
to the parents’ and children’s interests.86 The ECHR, however, dismissed 
most of the applicant’s claim. It considered that, since a lawyer had 
84 RMS v Spain (n 1), paras 95, 98.
85 In this vein, Colm O’Cinneide, ‘The right to equality: A substantive legal 
norm or vacuous rhetoric?’ (2008) 1 UCLHRLR 80, 83–4 91–4.
86 Sahin v Germany App no 30943/96 (ECHR, 8 July 2003), para 63; Barbara 
Kussbach, ‘Effective human rights protection for children in care. Does the UK 
provide effective remedies under the European Convention on Human Rights 
against the non-implementation of care orders?’ (2007) 4 EHRR 1, 12. 
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 represented the applicant before the judicial authorities and she had been 
able to present submissions to support her case, there were no  discernible 
failings attributable to the domestic courts in this respect. The Court 
only questioned the conduct of the judicial authorities to the extent that 
they limited themselves to reiterate the assertions made by the social 
services and allowed the lapse of time to uphold the girl’s placement in 
 pre-adoption foster care, frustrating family reunification.87 However, in 
my view, the applicant’s complaint can hardly be limited to that. It is 
plausible to think that her discontent was also linked to the lack of a timely 
and thorough judicial review in the first place. The applicant was able to 
judicially challenge the decisions taken since 1 February 2006 (about six 
months after the removal) and a judicial hearing took place more than 
a year and a half after the separation, without the participation of all 
 interested parties. These shortcomings seem to have gone rather unnoticed 
in RMS. I contend that the Court could have further engaged with the 
actual experience of the applicant and her daughter along the judiciary 
and with the array of judicial guarantees afforded by the international 
corpus of children’s rights.
UNICEF and the CRC Committee have both underscored that state 
reservations to article 9 CRC (judicial control over child separation) 
based on domestic legislation authorizing social workers to take children 
into care without a court hearing or judicial review are incompatible with 
the rights of the child.88 In the applicant’s case there was judicial review, 
but it came too late. The wording of article 9 CRC does not contain an 
express requirement of speediness. Nonetheless, the provision cannot be 
interpreted as lacking such a requisite. This, like the judicial  intervention 
in itself, is needed in order to ensure an effective judicial oversight over 
administrative child removal and placement. At the time of drafting 
article 9, many state representatives emphasized the need to expedite 
judicial review so as to ensure that the separation period would be the 
shortest possible.89 Furthermore, articles 8 and 12 CRC are also relevant 
in  interpreting article 9. The former demands that a child’s identity, 
including family ties, be ‘speedily’ re-established. Under article 12 every 
87 RMS v Spain (n 1), para 92.
88 UNICEF, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (3rd edn, 2007) 129. See also Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
Concluding Observations to Lebanon (2002) CRC/C/15/Add.169, paras 36–7.
89 Travaux Préparatoires, UN Doc E/1982/12/Add.1, C, 49–55 reproduced in 
Sharon Detrick (ed.), The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. A 
Guide to the Travaux Préparatoires (Martinus Nijhoff 1992) 168; UNICEF (n 88), 
128. 
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child is entitled to be heard and have his or her views considered in any 
administrative or judicial procedure affecting the child.
In 2012 the South African Constitutional Court declared part of the 
Children Protection Act to be unconstitutional insofar as it failed to provide 
for automatic judicial review of child removal and placement decisions 
made by social workers or police officials. Interestingly, the case leading 
to the judgment concerned the removal of children from parents living in 
poverty.90 Invoking the CRC, the Constitutional Court reasoned as follows:
It might be argued that this remedy is already available, since no provision 
precludes the family from approaching a court . . . Although this may be true 
in a formal sense, it is not true in a functional sense. It is unfair for the law to 
empower the state to initiate the removal of a child from her or his family, but 
to place the onus on the affected family to initiate the review of that removal. 
By requiring the family to bear, at least initially, the cost of pursuing review 
proceedings, the impugned provisions are too restrictive of [the] children’s 
rights protected.91
A contextualized approach like this one is missing in the RMS judgment. 
Moreover, and besides the issue of promptness, an effective judicial 
review of child removal requires that all interested parties, including 
the child, be heard in the proceedings, which must be conducted before 
 specialized courts.92 In RMS, however, the applicants’ extended family 
was not allowed to participate in the judicial proceedings. While the Court 
observed that the applicant’s great-uncle had not had an opportunity to 
express his views in the judicial proceedings (and therefore the finding that 
he was ‘overwhelmed’ to care for the child lacked supportive evidence), 
it did not explicitly frame this as a flaw in the decision-making process. 
Additionally, the non-specialized character of the domestic courts did not 
motivate any comment from the Court.
Neither was the applicant’s child involved in the proceedings. As to 
whether and how the judicial and administrative authorities  endeavoured 
to hear the child and have her views taken into consideration, some 
 preliminary remarks are needed. First, the right of the child to be directly 
heard in court is not absolute and due regard to his or her age and 
 maturity may justify a limitation to that right.93 Second, national courts 
90 C and Others v Department of Health and Social Development, Gauteng and 
Others Case CCT 55/11 (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 11 January 2012).
91 ibid 37.
92 Convention on the Rights of the Child, article 9(2).
93 Convention on the Rights of the Child, article 12; Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, General Comment of 1 July 2009 on Article 12: The Right 
of the Child to be heard (2009) CRC/C/GC/12, paras 20–21; Guidelines of the 
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enjoy discretion as to the means to ascertain the relevant facts of a case, 
including those affecting children.94 In RMS the applicant’s daughter was 
aged three years and ten months when she was taken into care, about five 
years and six months at the time of the first judicial hearing and eight 
years when the foster care decision was upheld. In Sahin v Germany,95 
the Court observed that the child was about three years and ten months 
old when the appeal proceedings on her custody started, and five years 
and two months at the time of the Regional Court’s decision. The Court 
was of the opinion that despite the fact that the girl was not heard by the 
German courts, they did not overstep their margin of appreciation. The 
Court reached that  conclusion after being satisfied that a well-trained 
expert had interviewed the girl and her parents, evaluated her attitude 
towards them and concluded that hearing the child in court may had 
entailed a risk for her.96 In RMS, however, we do not find any similar 
evaluation of the steps undertaken by the Spanish authorities to address 
the issue of child  participation and the consideration of her views before 
the domestic courts and the administrative authorities.97 In the rewritten 
judgment, these omissions are remedied in the analysis of the fairness of 
the  decision-making processes (see paras 78–81 ter).
4. CONCLUSION
The case of RMS v Spain is reflective of the fact that poor families, 
 particularly poor women and children, are too often disproportionally 
impacted by child protection schemes which rely on a ‘privatized’ and 
gendered notion of child care. In short, poverty is frequently mistaken for 
child neglect. And parents, or more precisely, mothers, are seen as the main 
or the sole person responsible for that. This image is fuelled by  prejudices 
about the experience of poverty and dominant notions on valued families. 
A common result is child separation from young, single mothers who, as the 
primary care-givers and the main target of the  aforesaid  preconceptions, 
are overly deprived of their parenting rights, with the ensuing harm for 
their children. This chapter has attempted to  demonstrate that although 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on Child-friendly Justice and 
their Explanatory Memorandum, (adopted on 17 November 2010, edited 31 May 
2011) Explanatory Memorandum. General Comments, (Participation), para 32.
94 Sahin v Germany (n 86), para 73. 
95 ibid. 
96 ibid, paras 74–77.
97 In conformity with Council of Europe (CM/Rec(2011)12, 2011) (n 51) 7.
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the judgment on RMS is overall welcome, its reasoning could have been 
improved by undertaking an integrated approach to the rights of women 
and children living in poverty. Such approach calls upon the Court (1) 
to unequivocally declare the  disproportionality of the care orders and 
the impermissibility of family separation on the sole grounds of poverty; 
(2) to challenge the harmful stereotypes at play and acknowledge their 
 discriminatory effect; and (3) to further scrutinize the decision-making 
processes. This integrated framework would not only have better done 
justice to the existing rights regimes applicable to women and children 
living in poverty, but also to the lived experience of the rights holders 
involved in the case.
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APPENDIX
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
. . . .
2. The Court’s assessment
 . . . .
 (a) General principles [fragment deleted]
69. [Original paragraph 69 deleted] According to the Court’s established 
case law, the mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s company 
constitutes a fundamental element of family life (see Kutzner v. Germany, 
§  58; Saleck Bardi v. Spain, no. 66167/09, § 50, 24 May 2011, § 49). 
Domestic measures hindering family ties, such as care proceedings, consti-
tute an  interference with the right protected by Article 8 of the Convention 
(K. and T. v. Finland [GC], no 25702/94, § 51). The interference will be justi-
fied if it is prescribed by law, pursues one or more legitimate aims under the 
second paragraph of this provision and is necessary in a democratic society 
to achieve them (Wallová and Walla v. The Czech Republic, no. 23848/04, 
§ 68). In assessing whether the measure was “necessary in a democratic 
society”, two aspects of the proceedings or measures require consideration. 
Firstly, the Court must examine whether, in the light of the case as a whole, 
the reasons adduced to justify the measures were “relevant and sufficient”; 
secondly it must examine whether the decision-making process was fair 
and afforded due respect to the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the 
Convention (see K. and T. v. Finland, cited above, § 154; R. and H. v. the 
United Kingdom, no. 35348/06, §§ 75 and 81, 31 May 2011).
70. [Original paragraph 70 deleted]  The Court reaffirms the principle 
established in its case-law under article 8 and contained in Article 9 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child according to which States Parties 
shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents 
against her will, except when competent authorities subject to prompt and 
periodical judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and 
procedures, that such a separation is necessary in the best interests of the 
child. Such determination may be necessary in very serious cases such as 
those involving abuse, injury or neglect of the child. In this context, the Court 
recalls that it is not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more 
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beneficial environment for his or her upbringing (see Wallová and Walla v. 
The Czech Republic, cited above, § 71). Family separation must be supported 
by sufficiently sound and weighty considerations in the interests of the child. 
Furthermore, where such a decision has been taken, all interested parties 
shall be given an opportunity to participate in the respective administrative 
and judicial proceedings and make their views known.
71. [Fragment deleted]  In addition, the Court has repeatedly held 
that  . . . taking a child into care should normally be regarded as a 
 temporary measure to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permit, 
and any measures implementing temporary care should be consistent 
with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parents and the child (see 
K. and T. v.  Finland [GC], no. 25702/94, § 178, ECHR 2001-VII). The 
positive duty to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as 
reasonably feasible will begin to weigh on the competent authorities with 
progressively increasing force as from the commencement of the period of 
care, subject always to its being balanced against the duty to consider the 
best interests of the child. Furthermore, the positive obligations are not 
confined to ensuring that children can rejoin their parents or have contact 
with them, but also extend to all the preparatory steps to be taken to that 
end (see, mutatis mutandis, Kosmopoulou v. Greece, no. 60457/00, § 45, 5 
February 2004, and Amanalachioai v. Romania, no. 4023/04, § 95, 26 May 
2009). [Fragment deleted]
71 bis. Positive measures under Article 8 also require States to support 
 families and caregivers in childrearing, especially where they are 
in a  situation of vulnerability. In this connection, Recommendation 
Rec(2006)19 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
on policy to support positive parenting, adopted on 13 December 2006, 
 indicates that policies and measures in the field of support for parenting 
should take into account the importance of a sufficient standard of living 
to engage in positive parenting. Governments should also ensure that 
children and parents have access to an appropriate level and diversity of 
resources (material, psychological, social and cultural). The Court notes 
that in its 2010  concluding observations on Spain, the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child expressed its concern about the fact that many 
families still lack appropriate assistance in the  performance of their 
 child-rearing  responsibilities, in particular families in crisis situations due 
to poverty, absence of adequate housing, or separation. The Committee 
was  particularly concerned at the situation of children in families of 
foreign origin and single-parent families. (CRC/C/ESP/3-4, adopted at its 
1583rd meeting, held on 1 October 2010)
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72. Each Contracting State must equip itself with an adequate and 
 sufficient legal arsenal to ensure compliance with the positive and  negative 
 obligations imposed on it under Article 8 of the Convention. The 
Court acknowledges that the adoption of childcare measures is a very 
 sensitive matter that poses difficult questions to State authorities. Moreover, 
 domestic authorities have the benefit of direct contact with all the persons 
concerned and therefore are better placed to assess the circumstances of 
each case. While it is not the Court’s task to substitute itself for the domestic 
 authorities, [fragment deleted] it is for the Court to ascertain whether the 
domestic authorities, in applying and interpreting the applicable legal 
provisions, secured the guarantees set forth in Article 8 of the Convention, 
particularly taking into account the child’s best interests (see, mutatis 
mutandis, Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, § 141, 
ECHR 2010, and K.A.B. v. Spain, cited above, § 115).
 (b) Application of these principles in the present case
. . .
77. [Original paragraph 77 deleted] The Court observes that it is not con-
tested that the decision to place the applicant’s child in institutional and foster 
care as well as to restrict the applicant’s contact rights constituted an interfer-
ence with her right to respect for her family life within the meaning of Article 
8 § 1 of the Convention. It must therefore be determined whether the interfer-
ence was justified under Article 8 § 2, namely, whether it was in accordance 
with the law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic 
society. Based on Articles 172 and 173 of the Spanish Civil Code and further 
domestic law provisions (see paragraph 53 above), the Court finds that the 
contested measure was “prescribed by law”. It also appears from the motiva-
tion provided by the administrative and judicial authorities that their decisions 
were aimed at safeguarding the best  interests of the  applicant’s child. The 
interference in question therefore pursued the  legitimate aim of protecting 
the rights and freedoms of others under Article 8 § 2. Accordingly, the Court 
shall focus on determining whether such interference satisfied the require-
ments of necessity in a democratic society. This implies an  examination of the 
proportionality of the contested measures, which must be based on relevant 
and sufficient reasons, and on the  fairness of the  decision-making process. The 
court shall first examine this last requirement.
1. Fairness of the decision making-processes: speediness and participation
71. [Original paragraph 78 deleted, save one fragment] The Court 
observes that the administrative authorities were empowered to take the 
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applicant’s daughter into care, declare her abandonment and undertake her 
guardianship. While the applicant was entitled to challenge these decisions 
before a court, in the meantime the administrative authorities decided to 
provisionally place her daughter in foster care. In this context, the Court is of 
the view that prompt access to a court by the family and the child concerned 
as well as regular judicial review of the measures adopted were of the utmost 
importance. The Court observes that in the present case . . . the applicant 
was able to present submissions in support of her case, in the context of 
judicial proceedings in which she was represented by a lawyer, at least 
from 1 February 2006 onwards. However, the Court views with concern 
that about six months elapsed between the child’s removal and the applicant’s 
 intervention in those proceedings. Furthermore, a hearing before the non-
specialised Granada first instance judge no. 3 concerning the declaration of 
abandonment only took place in May 2007 (about a year and a half after the 
removal).
72. The Court observes that, in cases concerning family life, the 
 breaking-off of contact with a very young child may result in the 
 progressive deterioration of the child’s relationship with his or her parent 
(see, among other authorities, Pini and Others v. Romania, nos. 78028/01 
and 78030/01, § 175, ECHR 2004-V (extracts), and K.A.B. v. Spain, cited 
above, § 103). This also holds true in the present case. In this regard, 
the Court observes that expedited judicial review is crucial to ensure that 
the separation period be as short as possible. A requirement of speediness 
is therefore implicit in the procedural safeguards imposed by Article 8. 
Domestic authorities are also expected to regularly examine the family 
 situation. This interpretation is furthermore consistent with Articles 8, 9 and 
12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
3. In assessing the quality of the decision-making process leading to the 
splitting up of the family, the Court takes into account, in particular, whether 
the conclusions of the domestic authorities were based on adequate evidence 
(including, as appropriate, statements by witnesses, reports by competent 
authorities, psychological and other expert assessments and medical notes) 
and whether the interested parties, in particular the parents or caregivers, 
including members of the extended family as well as the child concerned 
when applicable, had sufficient opportunity to participate in the procedure in 
question (see Saviny v. Ukraine, no. 39948/06, § 51, 18 December 2008). In 
view of these considerations . . . the Court notes a serious lack of diligence 
in the procedure implemented by the authorities responsible for the child’s 
guardianship, placement and possible adoption (see §§ 88–90 below) (see 
K.A.B. v. Spain, cited above, § 104).
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81 bis. [Original Paragraph 88 modified] [Fragment deleted] The Court 
notes that the judge rejected [the applicant’s] proposal of placing her 
 daughter in the foster care of her great-uncle on the grounds that the 
applicant’s great-uncle was not a suitable candidate for fostering minors, 
without giving any reasons for this assertion, but simply stating that the 
applicant’s great-uncle would be “overburdened” since he was already 
taking care of the applicant’s other two children (see paragraph 34 above). 
The Court is in agreement with the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
that protection of the family extends to the maintenance of ties with members 
of the extended family (General comment No. 14 on the Right of the Child, 
CRC/C/GC/14, 2013, §§ 59–60). Thus, the Court regrets that domestic 
authorities had disregarded, without motivation, such alternative for keeping 
“G” under the care of the great-uncle. This would have allowed the girl to 
remain close to her family, including her siblings who were also under the 
care of the applicant’s great-uncle. This alternative had to be assessed within 
the context of the applicant’s extended family, her  particular living circum-
stances and the views of all the parties concerned. As the  applicant’s great-
uncle was not granted leave to take part in the  proceedings, he did not 
have an opportunity to express his views on the subject. This runs against 
the requirements of fairness and participation of all parties concerned 
embodied in the procedural aspects of Article 8, which is line with Article 12 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
81 ter. The Court considers that, had the applicant’s vulnerability at 
the time her daughter was taken into care been taken into consideration, 
this might have played an important role in understanding the situation 
of the child and her mother within both the administrative and the judicial 
proceedings. [Fragment deleted]. In addition to the applicant’s great-uncle’s 
participation in the judicial proceedings, the Court is of the view that the 
issue of the child’s participation must also be considered. The Court observes 
that as a general rule it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before 
them, including the means used to ascertain the relevant facts (Sahin v. 
Germany, no. 30943/96 § 73). Moreover, the question of hearing a child also 
depends on the specific circumstances of each case, having due regard to the 
age and maturity of the child concerned. The Court notes that the applicant’s 
daughter was aged three years and ten months when she was taken into care, 
about five years and six months at the time of the first-instance judge hearing 
and eight years when the foster care decision was upheld. However, the 
 material before the Court’s consideration does not provide any indication as 
to whether and how the administrative and judicial authorities ascertained at 
any time the possibility to hear G’s views and assess her wishes. Taking into 
account the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion that the decision-making 
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process was not based on sufficient evidence nor allowed the participation of 
all the persons involved, including the child concerned.
. . .
4. [Paragraph 82 deleted]
2. Relevant and sufficient reasons to justify family breakdown:  prohibition 
of separation on the sole ground of poverty and State duties to support 
childrearing
5. Even assuming that in the circumstances of the case the social worker 
A.L.N. may had had reason to believe that [fragment deleted] the  situation 
and the best interests of the child [fragment deleted] made necessary to 
place the applicant’s child in a home, the decision in question should have 
been followed swiftly by appropriate measures to examine in depth the 
child’s situation and her relationship with her parents or caregivers, while 
complying with the rules in force . . . The Court notes that no  consideration 
was given at any stage of the administrative procedure to the fact that the 
child had been very young when she was separated from her mother, to 
the existing emotional bond between mother and child and between the 
latter and her siblings and extended family or to the length of time that had 
elapsed since their separation and the attendant consequences for both of 
them.
6. In contrast to other cases which the Court has been called upon to 
examine, the applicant’s child in the present case had not been  subjected to 
violence or to physical or psychological ill-treatment [references deleted]. 
The courts did not note any lack of emotional development (see,  conversely, 
Kutzner v. Germany, no. 46544/99, § 68, ECHR 2002-I), or any worrying 
health problems on the part of the child or psychological instability on 
the part of the parents [references deleted]. While it is true that in some 
cases declared inadmissible by the Court, the children concerned may have 
been placed in care because of unsatisfactory living conditions or material 
deprivation, this was never the sole reason on which the decision of the 
domestic courts was based, since other factors such as the psychological 
state of the parents or their inability to provide their child with emotional 
and educational support were also considered [references deleted].
7. In the present case the applicant’s ability to provide her minor 
 daughter, G., with educational and emotional support was not formally at 
issue [fragment deleted]. The care order in respect of the applicant’s child 
was made because of the applicant’s difficult financial situation at the time. 
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The Court considers that financial constraints or poverty should never be the 
only justification for the removal of a child from his or her family nor can this 
circumstance legitimise the prolongation of the family separation. Financial 
difficulties should rather prompt authorities to provide adequate support to 
the family in question. This principle is enshrined in the UN Guidelines for 
the Alternative Care of Children and has been upheld by the UN Committee 
on the Rights of the Child and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe (Doc. 13730, 13 March 2015, §§ 14, 48–53). Thus, the shortage 
of funds faced by the applicant was [fragment deleted] a  situation which 
the national authorities could have helped remedy by means other than 
the complete break-up of the family, a measure of last resort to be applied 
only in the most serious cases.
8. In the Court’s view, the Spanish administrative authorities should 
have considered other less drastic measures than taking the child into 
care. Before considering the split of the family, public authorities have a key 
role to play in supporting families and their childrearing functions. The role 
of the social welfare authorities is precisely to help persons in difficulty 
who are not sufficiently familiar with the system, to provide them with 
 guidance and to advise them on matters such as the different types of 
benefits  available, the possibility of obtaining social housing and other 
means of overcoming their difficulties, such as those originally sought by 
the applicant (see paragraph 8 above). Moreover, States are  particularly 
called upon to fulfil their supportive duties with regard to families in a 
 situation of greater vulnerability such as that of the applicant who was a 
single young mother experiencing socio-economic difficulties. The Court 
also regrets that instead of examining whether steps could be taken to assist 
the applicant and avoid family separation, the judgment of 18 May 2007 
limited itself to  conclude, without any supportive evidence, that the child 
was in a state of wholesale physical and psychological neglect either as a 
result of the  ignorance, lack of social skills or possible mental illness of the 
applicant.
9. The Court further notes that the initial finding that G. had been 
abandoned was reproduced automatically throughout the subsequent 
procedure, during which the intention of the administrative authorities 
to place the child elsewhere was clearly expressed . . . In the Court’s view, 
the administrative and judicial authorities simply relied on stereotyped 
views of the applicant (see paragraphs 97–98 bis below) and reproduced 
the  successive decisions without making any new findings or assessing 
how the circumstances might have changed on the basis of tangible 
evidence.
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10. [Original paragraph moved to and transformed in new paragraph 
81 bis above]
. . . .
11. [Original paragraph moved to and transformed in new paragraph 
81 ter above]
. . .
93. In view of these considerations and notwithstanding the margin of 
appreciation enjoyed by the respondent State in the matter, the Court 
concludes that the Spanish authorities [fragment deleted] did not provide 
sufficient reasons to justify the issuance of the care orders and failed to 
adopt appropriate positive measures to assist the applicant in overcoming 
her  material difficulties and secure the right to family life of the applicant 
and her daughter. The State party also failed to ensure the fairness of the 
 decision making-process leading to the enforcement of the care orders in 
breach of Article 8. All this renders the family separation disproportional.
12. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 8.
. . .
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 IN CONJUNCTION 
WITH ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
95. The applicant complained of discrimination on the grounds of her 
race, her Guinean origin, the colour of her skin, her physical appearance, 
her culture and way of life, since the extended structure of her family was 
not understood by the Spanish courts. She relied on Article 14 of the 
Convention.
96. The Government contested that argument.
97. [Original paragraph deleted] According to the Court’s case law, Article 
14 comes into play whenever the measures complained of are linked to the 
exercise of a right guaranteed by the Convention. The Court notes that this 
complaint is linked [fragment deleted] to the circumstances that led to the 
forced separation of the applicant and her child in violation of Article 8. The 
applicant alleges that the authorities were biased against her (see paragraph 
64 above) and claims that she has been discriminated against on the basis 
of, inter alia, her race, physical appearance and way of life. According to 
Recommendation Rec(2005)5 of the Committee of Ministers, the decision 
taken about the placement of a child and the placement itself should not be 
subject to discrimination, including on the basis of social origin or any other 
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status of the child and/or his or her parents. Furthermore, the Court is of the 
view that the disproportionate taking of children into care from particularly 
vulnerable groups such as households led by single women, parents and 
children with disability or families living in poverty, may be indicative of 
discrimination. This also holds true where care orders are made on the basis 
of discriminatory attitudes and assumptions such as harmful stereotypes that 
regard certain persons as incapable of parenting. In light of the foregoing, 
and given that the Court is the master of the characterization to be given 
in law to the facts submitted to its examination, the Court is of the opinion 
that the applicant’s complaint under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 
8 may be characterized as a complaint of intersectional discrimination on 
the grounds of gender, race and social origin or “other social status”. Thus, 
the applicant’s complaint under Article 14 in combination with article 8 is 
admissible.
97 bis. While the Court observes that no statistics or data concerning 
the over-representation of impoverished single mothers or afro-descendant 
 population in child welfare proceedings has been submitted before it, it is 
of the view that the applicant’s allegations must be viewed in light of the 
reasons provided by the administrative and judicial authorities involved in 
the implementation of the care orders in respect of G. and in the restriction 
of the applicant’s contact rights. In this connection, the Court reiterates its 
concern regarding the unfounded assertions made by State authorities as 
to the  supposed abandonment of G. and her siblings as well as the alleged 
 inability of the applicant and her great-uncle to care for G. Further, the 
Court is struck by the assumptions invoked by the judicial authorities as to 
the  supposed ignorance, lack of social skills, mental illness and  neglectful 
behaviour of the applicant (see paragraphs 30, 34 and 43 above). The 
Court also takes notes of the domestic authorities’ assumptions concerning 
 insufficient efforts made by the applicant to overcome her socio-economic 
difficulties and the  requirement of evidence to prove that the applicant’s child 
would benefit from being reunited with her mother.
98. [Original paragraph deleted] The Court notes with concern that the 
aforesaid authorities’ assertions, lacking any concrete evidence, denote 
negative stereotypes about the applicant on the basis of her role as a 
mother and her socio-economic status. The State has not provided evidence 
to contest the stereotyped nature of those views, which constituted the 
only basis to separate the applicant from her daughter. The Court recalls 
the position of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women according to which harmful gender stereotypes constitute 
a form of discrimination against women (General recommendation No. 
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28, CEDAW/C/GC/28, 16 December 2010, § 22). The Court also takes 
note of the UN Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights 
(adopted by the Human Rights Council on 27 September 2012, in resolution 
21/11, Principles 21 and 72) and the views expressed by the UN Committee 
on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (General Comment No. 20 on 
 Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights, E/C.12/GC/20, 
2 July 2009, § 35) as well as the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of People 
Living in Poverty (report submitted by Magdalena Sepúlveda, A/66/265, 
2011, 2011, § 7) with regard to prejudice and stigma for reasons of poverty 
and the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of social condition or 
socio-economic status. Harmful stereotypes related to poverty include the 
assumption that persons in socio-economic disadvantage are responsible for 
their own destitution, do not make enough efforts to overcome it and neglect 
their children. In the case at hand, the Court is of the view that prejudiced 
views related to poverty intersected with gender stereotypes, giving rise to 
misconceptions about the lack of parenting capacities of the applicant in her 
condition as an impoverished single woman living within an unconventional 
family. Furthermore, the Court is in agreement with the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights’ finding that “a determination based on unfounded 
and stereotyped assumptions about the parent’s capacity and suitability to 
ensure and promote the child’s wellbeing and development is not appropriate 
for the purpose of guaranteeing the legitimate goal of protecting the child’s 
best interest.” (Case of Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile, Judgment of 24 
February 2012, § 111)
98 bis. The Court concludes that the authorities’ reliance on such  stereotypes, 
even if unintended, constitutes discrimination prohibited by Article 14. 
In addition, the prohibition of discrimination set out in Article 2 of the 
Convention of the Rights of the Child in combination with Article 9 of the 
same instrument requires States Parties to ensure that children are not 
discriminated against in their enjoyment of parental care on the basis of 
their family configuration, including its socio-economic circumstances and 
structure. In sum, there has been a breach of Article 14 in conjunction with 
Article 8.
